As ICS defense and detection matures, both defenders and products move increasingly away from traditional IOC approaches to newer, more robust models: anomaly detection, and threat behavioral analytics. While an appropriate, defense-in-depth position would work to integrate both approaches into a single defensive schema, scarce resources and funding constraints mean that organizations will need to choose one or the other for their monitoring and detection needs.
After providing an overview of both these approaches to threat detection, this presentation will then critically evaluate what these approaches enable from a defensive perspective as specifically required for ICS networks. The result will not just be a simple ‘product type’ comparison, but rather a robust investigation of the theoretical underpinnings of these approaches, and what they enable a defender to accomplish within the monitored network. Specific details will include completeness of coverage beyond ‘known bad’ items; ability to incorporate contextualization into alerting; and capability for detecting realistic threats in the ICS environment.
To provide appropriate context to the discussion, the approaches will be compared to ICS intrusion examples as a means of evaluating their efficacy and viability. By adopting a critical approach to this evaluation, ICS defense practitioners can gain insight into the true costs and benefits of anomaly detection and threat behavior analytics. The expected result of this presentation will be an analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of these approaches with respect to the specific requirements for ICS defense, enabling attendees to evaluate relative to their own operational needs which approach works best for their environment.